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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 OAKLAND DIVISION

13  
14 MASTEROBJECTS, INC.,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 GOOGLE INC.,

18 Defendants.

Case No. 4:15-cv-01775-PJH

**GOOGLE INC.'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND COMBINED RESPONSIVE BRIEF  
ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
SINGLE ISSUE AND MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON  
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND  
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION**

19 Date: February 24, 2016

20 Time: 9:00 a.m.

Place: Courtroom 3 - 3rd Floor

Judge: Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton

**NOTICE OF MOTION**

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on Wednesday, February 24, 2016 at 9:00 a.m., in the Courtroom of United States District Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton, Oakland Courthouse, Courtroom 3 - 3rd Floor, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612, Defendant Google Inc. ("Google") shall and hereby does move the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment. This Motion is based on this notice of motion, the following points and authorities, the supporting Declarations of Jordan R. Jaffe and Martin C. Rinard, Ph.D., exhibits to these declarations, and such other matters and further argument as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion or as allowed by the Court.

**STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND RELIEF REQUESTED**

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Google seeks an order that MasterObjects, Inc. ("MasterObjects") is collaterally estopped from arguing for a claim construction for the Additional Characters terms beyond that which was ordered by this Court in *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 11-1054-PJH (N.D. Cal.). In the event that the Court declines to find collateral estoppel and furthermore adopts MasterObjects' proposed claim constructions, Google seeks an order granting summary judgment that claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37 of U.S. Patent No. 8,539,024 are invalid for failure to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

DATED: October 29, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The Court rightly may be experiencing déjà vu. MasterObjects has again sued Google, accusing the same Google products of infringing the same family of patents. The '024 Patent asserted here contains the identical specification as the previously asserted '529 Patent, and the Additional Characters claim terms here contain no material differences from those this Court previously construed. MasterObjects nonetheless contends, as it did before, that its claims cover re-sending the entire input string, not just the changes to the string. This Court should again reject MasterObjects' constructions—for precisely the same reasons it did before—and find that Google does not infringe.

The outcome here is compelled, as a matter of claim construction and collateral estoppel, by this Court's prior findings concerning the identical patent specification. This Court circumscribed the scope of the claimed invention based on the following language in MasterObjects' patents: "[T]he protocol of the current invention" is one that "send[s] *just the changes* to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer." '529 Pat., 20:11-14 (emphasis added). The Court held: "Consistent with *Trading Techs.* and *Honeywell*, the court finds that the use of 'the current invention' here indicates that the description is intended to apply to the invention as a whole, and not just a single embodiment." *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 11-1054-PJH (N.D. Cal.) ("*MasterObjects I*"), Dkt. 153 at 16-17. The Court further found that: "While plaintiff does provide support for its argument that each 'change' can be more than just a single character, it does not provide adequate support for its argument that the entire character string is re-sent as the user types in a query." *Id.* at 17.

MasterObjects attempted, unsuccessfully, to overturn those findings at every turn. It filed a motion for leave for reconsideration, which this Court denied. It then stipulated to noninfringement in order to immediately appeal the ruling to the Federal Circuit. Following briefing and argument, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed this Court's judgment. Now, through its pursuit of the same theory in this case, MasterObjects again attempts to avoid this Court's prior judgment and the Federal Circuit's affirmance. It should not be permitted to do so.



1 The Court's prior findings remain correct and apply with equal force to the present issue.

2 In its brief, MasterObjects once again takes claim terms out of context and proposes to  
3 construe them in a vacuum in order to stretch the claim scope beyond the patent disclosure. This  
4 is improper and contravenes basic principles of claim construction. MasterObjects seeks a patent  
5 monopoly on what its patent does not describe and what its inventors did not invent. *See Ariad*  
6 *Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 598 F.3d 1336, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("the purpose  
7 of the written description requirement is to ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set  
8 forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as  
9 described in the patent specification") (internal quotations omitted). The presently asserted  
10 claims, added in 2012, cannot change what the inventors described back in 2001 when they filed  
11 their initial applications for these patents.

12 Moreover, MasterObjects' proposed constructions, were this Court to adopt them, would  
13 render the claims invalid. In MasterObjects' view, the claims should be stretched to cover re-  
14 sending the entire input string from the client to the server. But the patent specification is bereft of  
15 any disclosure of re-sending the entire string from the client to the server. The claims under  
16 MasterObjects' (incorrect) view thus lack written description support, rendering them invalid.

17 The Court, therefore, should adopt Google's proposed constructions and find that Google  
18 does not infringe. In the alternative, were the Court to adopt MasterObjects' constructions, it  
19 should hold the claims invalid for failing to satisfy the written description requirement. Either  
20 way, MasterObjects loses—just as it did before.

## 21 **II. BACKGROUND**

### 22 **A. The MasterObjects Patents**

23 The patents asserted, construed, and found not infringed in *MasterObjects I* were U.S.  
24 Patent Nos. 8,112,529 (the "'529 Patent") and 8,060,639 (the "'639 Patent"). Here, MasterObjects  
25 asserts the '024 Patent, which issued on Sept. 17, 2013 and is a continuation of the '529 Patent.  
26  
27  
28

1 As such, the '529 and '024 Patents share the same specification.<sup>1</sup>

2 The MasterObjects patents broadly concern auto-complete functionality—"guessing" what  
3 the user is typing as the user types it and showing that information to the user. But the patent  
4 specification that both the '529 and the '024 Patents share admits that autocomplete functionality  
5 was known in the art before the MasterObjects patents were filed. For example, the idea of  
6 autocomplete functionality "as you type" was well known. '024 Pat., 3:43-67; '529 Pat., 3:34-57.  
7 "Many current systems provide[d] a mechanism to auto-complete words entered into fields and  
8 documents." '024 Pat., 3:44-45; '529 Pat., 3:34-35. "[S]imple, client-side auto-complete  
9 functions ... ha[d] been widely used throughout the computing world for many years." '024 Pat.,  
10 6:30-33; '529 Pat., 6:22-24. The specification admits, for example, that this functionality  
11 appeared in Microsoft's Internet Explorer (for previously-visited websites) and Microsoft Outlook  
12 (auto-completing previously-entered email addresses). '024 Pat., 3:47-53; '529 Pat., 3:37-43.

13 MasterObjects' patents allegedly improve on these prior art auto-complete programs in a  
14 client-server environment using the *specific* architecture described therein. The '024 Patent seeks  
15 to distinguish its invention by the *way* that it implemented known auto-complete functionality,  
16 including the specific manner of communicating from a client to the server that the inventors  
17 repeatedly described as their "invention."

18 The shared specification of the '024 and '529 Patents repeatedly explains to one of  
19 ordinary skill in the art what constitutes the inventors viewed as their "invention." Over and again  
20 it describes the specific manner of communicating from a client to the server as "the invention."  
21 These repeated references to "the invention" carry meaning. For example, the Abstract on the face  
22 of the patents states:

23 ***The invention*** provides a session-based bi-directional multi-tier client-server  
24 asynchronous information database search and retrieval system ***for sending a***  
25 ***character-by-character string of data to an intelligent server that can be***  
***configured to immediately analyze the lengthening string character-by-character***

---

26 <sup>1</sup> The '639 Patent is a continuation-in-part of the '529 Patent. As such, although its  
27 specification is similar to the '529 Parent application, it also contains some different material,  
28 which is permitted in such continuation-in-part filings.

and return to the client increasingly appropriate database information as the client sends the string.

'024 Pat., Abstract (emphasis added); '529 Pat., Abstract; *see also* '024 Pat., 8:31-38; '529 Pat., 8:26-33. As these statements demonstrate, “the invention” of MasterObjects’ patents is taking a “character-by-character string of data” and allowing the server to “immediately analyze the lengthening string character-by-character,” which permits the return of information “as the client sends the string.” '024 Pat., 8:31-38; '529 Pat., 8:26-33.

This approach derives, at least in part, from the patentee’s decision to design a system that synchronizes data held by the client and by the server, as opposed to transmitting and retransmitting the same query string data from the client to the server. The first line of the Summary of the Invention states: “The invention provides a system that offers a highly effective solution to the aforementioned disadvantages of both client-server and Internet systems by providing a way to synchronize the data entered or displayed on a client system with the data on a server system.” '024 Pat., 5:66-6:3. Thus, the patentees repeatedly distinguished their “invention” from prior art systems based on this synchronization feature. *Id.*; *see also* '024 Pat., 8:41-44; 18:53-55; 13:33-36.




Fig. 2  
(modified)




Fig. 4  
(modified)

Consistent with this description, the alleged invention is the specific software architecture described in the specification for client-server communications. The above annotated and cropped versions of Figures 2 and 4 illustrate two different depictions of the client (blue) and the server (green), and the communications between them (yellow) as described in the specification. Figure 4 depicts the process by which the characters “a, b, and c” are entered and transmitted from the client (blue) to the server (green) across the connection (yellow). The user first types in the character “a” (Step 403 of Figure 4). Character “a” is then sent from the client to the server using the “inputBufferAppend[‘a’]” message. The user then types another character “b”, which is also sent from the client to the server, using the message “inputBufferAppend[‘b’]” (Step 404). Importantly, the client never sends the string “ab” to the server. Rather, the server forms the string “ab” (step 405) from the separately sent characters “a” and “b” and uses this updated search string to update a set of results via the message “queryResult [‘ab’]” (Step 406). The user then enters a character “c,” and only that character “c” is sent to the server using the message “inputBufferAppend[‘c’]” (Step 407). The server then amalgamates new character “c” with the previous string “ab,” and the server uses the updated string “abc” to obtain an updated set of search results (Step 408). This process makes clear that only the new character (e.g., “c”) is sent to the server as a message after the user inputs it. *See also* ’024 Pat., 19:15-18 (“At Step 407 the user types a third character ‘c’ into the Questlet. While *this character* is being sent to the Server, a second and possibly third result set from the previous query is on its way to the Client.”) (emphasis added). Thus, as shown in Figure 4, under the invention, the client sends to the server only the changes to the user’s input (e.g., “c” rather than “abc”).

## **B. Procedural History**

On March 3, 2011, MasterObjects accused Google of infringing of U.S. Patent No. 7,752,326 (the “’326 Patent”). MasterObjects later amended its complaint to include accusations of infringement by Google of the ’529 and ’639 Patents. In *MasterObjects I*, this Court issued a claim construction order, which, among other things, construed terms referred to by the parties as

1 the Additional Characters terms.<sup>2</sup> *See MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 15-17. This Court described  
 2 the dispute regarding the construction of the Additional Characters terms as “over which  
 3 characters are sent to the server as the user types in the letters [of the query].” *Id.* at 16. Each of  
 4 the four Additional Characters terms the Court construed was worded differently, but contained  
 5 similar language. *Id.* at 15-16. This Court adopted Google’s proposed construction that the  
 6 Additional Characters terms require the server to send the client “only the changes to the input  
 7 string that were not sent in any previous consecutive query.” *Id.* at 17.

8 In its Claim Construction Order, the Court explained that upon reviewing each new query  
 9 from the user, “the server is not wiping its slate clean . . . but is instead combining the queries to  
 10 form the ‘lengthening string.’” *Id.* The Court also emphasized that the ’529 Patent specification  
 11 “confirm[ed] this understanding” and that the “use of ‘the current invention’ here indicates that the  
 12 description is intended to apply to the invention as a whole, and not just a single embodiment.” *Id.*  
 13 The Court further stated: “While [MasterObjects] does provide support for its argument that each  
 14 ‘change’ can be more than just a single character, it does not provide adequate support for its  
 15 argument that the entire character string is re-sent as the user types in a query.” *Id.*

16 MasterObjects moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order, arguing that the Court  
 17 misconstrued the Additional Characters terms. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 162. The Court rejected  
 18 MasterObjects’ motion and reaffirmed its construction. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 173. As a result,  
 19 MasterObjects stipulated to noninfringement. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 187. MasterObjects appealed  
 20 the judgment of this Court to the Federal Circuit, again arguing against this Court’s construction  
 21 of the Additional Characters terms. The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed this Court’s  
 22 judgment of noninfringement.

23 This spring, MasterObjects filed a new complaint in this action asserting that the “Google  
 24 Instant” feature infringed the ’024 Patent. MasterObjects later identified claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18,  
 25 19, 20, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37 as the asserted claims (hereafter the “Asserted Claims”).

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26  
 27 <sup>2</sup> This Court construed the Additional Characters terms in the ’529 and ’639 Patents.  
 28 MasterObjects dismissed its claims on the ’326 Patent. *See MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 1, n. 1.

**C. Scope Of The Single Issue To Be Decided By The Court**

The parties have agreed to stay discovery for a resolution of three case-dispositive issues: (1) construction of the claim term(s) that Google contends restricts the ability of the client object to send the entire input string to the server system, including any construction that would limit the claimed invention to sending “only the changes” or only “single characters”; (2) the collateral estoppel effect of the Court’s prior claim construction order; and (3) if MasterObjects’ position is adopted, whether the claims are invalid for failing to comply with the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Dkt. 33. The parties’ agreement regarding this “Single Issue” was memorialized in the Joint Case Management Statement. *Id.* The following are the claim terms proposed by Google under issue (1), above, which should be construed as “each query message consists of only the changes to the input string that were not sent in any previous consecutive query.” MasterObjects’ opening brief offers no construction for the Additional Characters terms.

<b>'024 Patent Claims</b>	<b>Terms<sup>3</sup></b>
1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, and 28	The client object that, while a user is providing input comprising a lengthening string of characters, sends query messages to the server system; whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional character are being input
32, 33	Wherein the client object that, while a user is providing input comprising a lengthening string of characters, sends query messages to the server system; whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being input by the user;
35	a client object adapted to receive input comprising a lengthening string of characters from a user, . . . , comprising a lengthening string of characters, . . . ,whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being input by the user;
36	wherein the client object, while a software process is providing input comprising a lengthening string of characters, sends query messages representing said input, to the server system; whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being input by the software process;
37	the client object that, while a user is providing input comprising a

<sup>3</sup> Unlike in MasterObjects’ briefing, Google addresses the terms in the order they appear in the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Statement, in accordance with this Court’s Standing Order, Instruction No. 5. Dkt. 36-1.



	lengthening string of characters, sends query messages representing said input to the server system; whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being input by the user;
--	--

The Joint Case Management Statement and this Court’s Case Management Order contain no provision permitting MasterObjects to propose its own separate terms for construction at this stage of the case. Dkt. Nos. 33, 34. Despite this, however, MasterObjects has unilaterally proposed constructions for three claim terms: “input,” “query” and “query messages.” Dkt. 36, Ex. A; Dkt. 40 at 10-14. Because Google did not propose to separately construe these terms as part of the Single Issue, they fall outside the scope of this preliminary proceeding. The Court should decline to consider MasterObjects’ proposed constructions of these terms at this stage.

### **III. THE ADDITIONAL CHARACTERS TERMS REQUIRE THAT THE CLIENT SENDS THE SERVER ONLY THE CHANGES TO THE INPUT STRING**

The Court should construe the Additional Characters claim terms consistent with its prior construction to require that “each query message consists of only the changes to the input string that were not sent in any previous consecutive query.” Like the Additional Characters terms in the ’529 and ’639 Patents, the claim terms here vary somewhat from claim to claim. But, as before, each Asserted Claim is limited in scope to sending only the changes. The claim language, specification, prosecution history, and inventor testimony—as well as this Court’s prior decisions and the affirmance by the Federal Circuit—all support this construction.

#### **A. Legal Standards For Claim Construction**

Claim construction is a question of law that may contain underlying factual issues. *Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015). The Federal Circuit explained the proper approach to claim construction in *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The meaning of some claim terms may be “readily apparent even to lay judges” such that construction “involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” *Id.* at 1314. But in cases where the claim language is not so apparent, “the court looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.” *Id.* Those sources include intrinsic evidence, which consists of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. *Id.*

1 at 1314. Those sources may also include extrinsic evidence such as dictionary definitions or  
 2 treatises concerning relevant scientific principles and meaning of technical terms. *Id.* However,  
 3 such extrinsic evidence “is less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally  
 4 operative meaning of claim language.” *Id.* at 1317 (quotation omitted).

5 **B. This Court’s Claim Construction Analysis In *MasterObjects I* Remains Correct**  
 6 **And Should Be Followed Here**

7 The Court does not construe the Additional Character terms on a blank slate. Rather, this  
 8 Court previously evaluated the same patent disclosure before it now (as the ’529 Patent), and  
 9 construed the Additional Characters terms in the parent of the ’024 Patent. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt.  
 10 153 at 16-17. This Court should follow that analysis as a matter of patent law and *stare decisis*.

11 In evaluating the patent specification in *MasterObjects I*, this Court made specific findings  
 12 regarding the content of the specification common to the ’529 and ’024 Patents:

13 The specification confirms this understanding, as “the protocol of the current  
 14 invention” is one that “send[s] just the changes to the input buffer, instead of  
 15 sending the entire input buffer.” ’529 patent, 20:11-14. Consistent with *Trading*  
 16 *Techs.* and *Honeywell*, the court finds that the use of “the current invention” here  
 17 indicates that the description is intended to apply to the invention as a whole, and  
 not just a single embodiment. While plaintiff does provide support for its argument  
 that each “change” can be more than just a single character, it does not provide  
 adequate support for its argument that the entire character string is re-sent as the  
 user types in a query.

18 *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 16-17. Those findings were correct. Indeed, on appeal, the Federal  
 19 Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment. This Court should reapply those findings, which are fatal  
 20 to all of *MasterObjects*’ arguments about the scope of the ’024 Patent claims.<sup>4</sup>

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24 <sup>4</sup> Although collateral estoppel also applies as explained *infra* in Section IV, this Court need  
 25 not decide that question if it construes the Additional Characters terms in Google’s favor. *Cf.*  
 26 *Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Microsoft Mobile Oy*, 597 F. App’x 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2014)  
 27 (“Whether or not collateral estoppel applies, the prior decision at the very least adds force to  
 28 support the district court’s construction . . . in the instant case . . .”).



**C. Construed Correctly, The Additional Characters Terms Require That The Client Sends The Server Only The Changes To The Input String.**

Even if the Court did not have the benefit of its prior rulings construing materially similar claim terms in the context of an identical patent specification, the Additional Characters terms in the '024 Patent should still be construed to require that “each query message consists of only the changes to the input string that were not sent in any previous consecutive query.” That outcome is compelled by the language of the asserted claims of the '024 Patent, the specification of the '024 Patent, and the file history, as well as the relevant extrinsic evidence.

**1. The Claim Language Indicates That The Client Sends The Server Only The Changes**

MasterObjects contends that claims of the '024 Patent contain “glaring” and “drastic[]” differences from those previously construed by this Court. Dkt. 40 at 18-19. MasterObjects is wrong. As shown below, the claims of the '024 Patent, like its parent '529 Patent, include the same concept of “additional characters” being sent to a server that comprise a “lengthening string.”

<b>Claim 1 of the '529 Patent (limited to sending “only the changes”)</b>	<b>Claim 1 of the '024 Patent (asserted in this action)</b>
wherein each of the corresponding consecutive <b><u>queries lengthens the string by the additional characters</u></b> , to form a <b><u>lengthening string</u></b> for retrieving matching content from the server system	the client object that, while a user is providing input <b><u>comprising a lengthening string of characters</u></b> , sends query messages to the server system;  whereby the query messages <b><u>represent the lengthening string as additional characters</u></b> are being input by the user

The plain meaning of the claim language in both patents requires that the client send only the changes to the server. Each of the Additional Characters terms refers to the user (or a software program in the case of claim 36) providing data that when combined comprises a “lengthening string.” The claims also state that the query messages (plural) sent from the client to the server “represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being input” by the user (or the software program). The meaning of this language is self-evident: As a user inputs characters on the client, the client sends those additional characters in messages to the server such that the

1 messages—taken together—represent the lengthening string of additional characters that is being  
2 input by the user.

3 The claim language does not support, and certainly does not mandate, a construction  
4 whereby the client would re-send the entire string of characters (including already-sent characters)  
5 to the server. Every independent claim states that the client sends “query messages” to the server,  
6 “whereby the query messages represent the lengthening string as additional characters are being  
7 input.” ’024 Pat., Cls. 1, 32, 35, 36, 37. That “whereby” clause indicates that the claims do not  
8 involve the client simply sending the “input” to the server. Rather the client sends “query  
9 messages,” which, taken together, represent the “lengthening string” composed of “additional  
10 characters.” In this way, the “whereby” clause mandates that the client send only the changes, not  
11 the prior input string as a whole, to the server. Any alternative interpretation of the claims would  
12 impermissibly render the “whereby” clause wholly superfluous. *Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v.*  
13 *Siemens AG*, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (a claim construction that renders claim terms  
14 superfluous is generally disfavored).

15 In sum, the claims of the ’024 Patent contain the same limitation that the Court previously  
16 found for the claims of the ’529 Patent: the client sends to the server only the changes to the input  
17 string. The differences in claim language on which MasterObjects relies are merely differences in  
18 form, not substance, and do not support a different claim scope.

## 19 2. The Specification Confirms That The Client Sends The Server Only The 20 Changes

21 “The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of ‘a fully integrated  
22 written instrument,’ consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For  
23 that reason, claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’ . . . [T]he  
24 specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is  
25 dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” *Phillips*, 415 F.3d at  
26 1315 (citations omitted).

27 In accordance with the *en banc* Federal Circuit’s guidance in *Phillips*, this Court  
28 previously took into account the specification of the MasterObjects patents in construing the

1 claims at issue in *MasterObjects I*. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 16-17 (“The specification  
 2 confirms this understanding, as “the protocol of the current invention” is one that “send[s] just the  
 3 changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer.”) (citing ’529 Pat., 20:11-  
 4 14.) It should do so again here. And because the specification at issue here is identical to the one  
 5 considered before, the Court can readily rely on its prior findings in construing the Additional  
 6 Characters terms here. *See, e.g.*, ’024 Pat., 20:14-17 (same passage cited by this Court in  
 7 *MasterObjects I*).

8 As explained throughout this brief, the plain meaning of the claim language in light of the  
 9 specification and other intrinsic evidence supports Google’s construction. However, if the Court  
 10 finds otherwise, these statements regarding the “invention” limit the scope of the claims, serving  
 11 as a disclaimer of any other scope, *see, e.g., Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.*, 778 F.3d  
 12 1021, 1024-26 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding statements regarding the “present invention” serve as a  
 13 disclaimer) (citing *SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1337,  
 14 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). *Trading Technologies* and *Honeywell* support the conclusion that  
 15 Google’s construction reflects the plain and ordinary meaning. *See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.*  
 16 *eSpeed, Inc.*, 595 F.3d 1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a “reference to ‘the present invention’  
 17 strongly suggests” that patentee is not describing a mere embodiment); *Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT*  
 18 *Indus., Inc.*, 452 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying *Phillips* to find the terms “this  
 19 invention” and “the present invention” to limit the claims). In *Honeywell*, the Federal Circuit  
 20 found that “[t]he public is entitled to take the patentee at his word and the word was that the  
 21 invention is a fuel filter.” *Id.* The public—and Google—is similarly entitled to take  
 22 *MasterObjects* at its word when it clearly and unequivocally described its “invention” as sending  
 23 “only the changes” and not re-sending the entire query. *See TriStrata, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 594  
 24 F. App’x 653, 656-657 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying *Philips* to construe the meaning of a term in  
 25 view of statements in the specification regarding the “invention”).

26 For the specific statement found by this Court to describe the “invention,” *MasterObjects*  
 27 points to the word “allows” and argues that it is permissive, not limiting. Dkt. 40 at 15-16.  
 28 *MasterObjects* raised this same argument before this Court and the Federal Circuit in

*MasterObjects I.*<sup>5</sup> It remains wrong. The plain import of the passage is that the messages *enable* sending just the changes to the input buffer rather than the entire input buffer. Neither this passage nor anything else in the patents suggests that sending just the changes is optional.

This Court’s findings accurately reflect the entirety of the specification, which consistently describes sending only the changes from the client to the server. The Abstract, for example, describes an invention whereby strings of data are sent “character-by-character.” ’024 Pat., Abstract (emphasis added) (“The invention provides a . . . system for *sending a character-by-character string of data to an intelligent server* . . .”); ’529 Pat., Abstract. This statement is important in understanding the asserted claims; courts “frequently look[] to the abstract to determine the scope of the invention.” *Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.*, 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

The Detailed Description then begins by repeating and reaffirming the “character-by-character” nature of “the invention.” ’024 Pat., 8:31-38; ’529 Pat., 8:26-33. The figures in the specification also show a process by which only changes are sent to the server. As described above, Figure 4 describes the process by which the characters “a, b, and c” are entered and transmitted from the client to the server:




FIG. 4

<sup>5</sup> Compare *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 14-1148 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Dkt. 29 at 44 with Dkt. 40 at 16.

1 *Id.* at Figure 4 (annotated). As Figure 4 illustrates, the invention involves the client (in blue)  
 2 communicating with the server (in green). It does so using dual “input buffers” that are  
 3 maintained on both the client and the server. *Id.* at 18:20-55. The invention operates by  
 4 synchronizing these two buffers using a series of messages. *Id.* at 18:53-55. These messages  
 5 include appending a new character on the buffer (e.g., when the user types a new letter, append it  
 6 to the buffer) or otherwise communicating a change in the buffer (e.g., delete a character when the  
 7 user presses the backspace button). *Id.* at 20:14-21. Figure 4 and its corresponding description in  
 8 the specification thus describe sending only the changes to the input buffer as a query from the  
 9 client to the server. *Id.* at Figure 4, 18:18-19:33. The specification never discloses the client re-  
 10 sending the entire input string to the server each time the user enters a new character. The  
 11 specification confirms the opposite, explaining that the protocol of “the present invention provides  
 12 a number of messages that allow the Client Quester to send just the changes to the input buffer,  
 13 instead of sending the entire input buffer.” ’024 Pat., 20:11-23 (emphasis added); ’529 Pat., 20:8-  
 14 20; *see also* Fig. 6; ’024 Pat., 20:3-5 (“If the event is a character event, the input buffer is updated  
 15 accordingly and Client Questers that have dependencies with the input buffer or the Result Set  
 16 also are notified (step 607) (emphasis added).

17 The specification further touts the ability of the “present invention” to “synchronize” data  
 18 between the input buffer on the client and the server, distinguishing its synchronization  
 19 architecture from prior art autocomplete systems. The Summary of the Invention states: “The  
 20 invention provides a system that offers a highly effective solution to the aforementioned  
 21 disadvantages of both client-server and Internet systems by providing a way ***to synchronize the***  
 22 ***data entered or displayed on a client system with the data on a server system.***” ’024 Pat. at 5:66-  
 23 6:3 (emphasis added); *id.* at 8:41-44 (same). These statements have particular weight given their  
 24 placement in the Summary of the Invention and without reference to a particular embodiment.  
 25 *VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.*, 767 F. 3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The fact that the  
 26 Summary of the Invention gives primacy to these attributes strongly indicates that the invention  
 27 requires more than just data security.”). The patent’s synchronization approach is the opposite of  
 28 re-sending the entire input string every time the user enters a character. Were it otherwise,

1 synchronizing the input buffer of the server with the client makes no sense; there would be no  
 2 point in synchronizing an input buffer on the server if one simply were sending the entire input  
 3 buffer wholesale in each query message.

### 4 3. The Prosecution History Supports Google's Constructions

5 Google's construction of the Additional Characters terms is further supported by the  
 6 prosecution histories of both the parent '529 Patent and the '024 Patent. *See Elkay Mfg. Co. v.*  
 7 *Ebco Mfg. Co.*, 192 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying the prosecution history of one patent  
 8 to a related, subsequently issued patent).

9 To distinguish its invention from the prior art, MasterObjects argued during prosecution of  
 10 the '529 Patent that its purported invention involves the server receiving from the client "single  
 11 string characters": "[T]he server object records, during the same session, each of a plurality of  
 12 queries, and in response to *receiving single string characters*, automatically matches the changing  
 13 query string against the content of the server system, *as it is being lengthened or shortened by*  
 14 *one or more characters.*" Declaration of Jordan R. Jaffe,<sup>6</sup> Ex. A ('529 File History, Dec. 21, 2005  
 15 Response to Office Action) at 13-14 (emphasis altered). Indeed, throughout prosecution  
 16 MasterObjects argued it was novel because only the changes are sent to the server.<sup>7</sup> In all of these  
 17 statements, the applicants represented the invention as one whereby the character string would be  
 18 altered, modified, lengthened and appended by the additional characters, which is inconsistent  
 19 with a construction by which the entire string is resent to the server with each update.

20 The prosecution history of the '024 Patent likewise supports the conclusion that the  
 21 claimed invention involves sending only the changes. To overcome a double-patenting rejection  
 22 based on its own '529 Patent, MasterObjects filed a terminal disclaimer limiting the term of the

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24 <sup>6</sup> Unless otherwise noted, exhibits are to the Declaration of Jordan R. Jaffe ("Jaffe Decl.").

25 <sup>7</sup> *See, e.g.*, Ex. D ('529 File History, Apr. 13, 2005 Response to Office Action) at 13  
 26 ("Furthermore, in the embodiment of the invention defined by Claim 1, a client is capable of  
 27 transmitting to a server a plurality of queries, within the same session, wherein *each of said*  
 28 *plurality of queries comprises a single string character*, and wherein each subsequent of said  
 plurality of queries *extends* the query string") (emphasis added)); *see also* Ex. A (Dec. 21, 2005  
 Response to Office Action) at 11.



1 '024 Patent to that of the '529 Patent. *See* Ex. B ('024 File History, July 23, 2013, Terminal  
 2 Disclaimer). A non-statutory double-patenting rejection is grounded in the understanding that the  
 3 claims of two patents contain no patentable distinction. *Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline*  
 4 *PLC*, 349 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In acquiescing to that rejection and agreeing to  
 5 the terminal disclaimer, MasterObjects belies its present assertions that the two sets of claims are  
 6 “drastically different.” Dkt. 40 at 18-19.

7 The total absence in the prosecution history of support for MasterObjects’ present claim  
 8 construction theory is also telling. Particularly in view of its co-pending litigation MasterObjects  
 9 had every incentive (according to its own explanation of its motivation, *see* Dkt. 40 at 8), to make  
 10 a record in the '024 Patent’s prosecution history of its intended claim scope and evidence in  
 11 support of that scope. The prosecution history, however, contains nothing to support  
 12 MasterObjects’ presently proposed claim constructions. Nowhere in the '024 Patent’s prosecution  
 13 history did MasterObjects identify an embodiment or disclosure in the specification involving re-  
 14 sending the entire input string from the client to the server. There is simply nothing in the '024  
 15 Patent’s file history to indicate that the Additional Characters terms in the '024 Patent’s claims  
 16 should be interpreted any differently than in the '529 Patent’s claims.

#### 17 4. Inventor Testimony Supports Google’s Constructions

18 Extrinsic evidence in the form of inventor testimony similarly supports Google’s proposed  
 19 construction of the Additional Characters terms. In *MasterObjects I*, named inventor Stephan van  
 20 den Oord provided deposition testimony, in which he described the purported invention’s  
 21 functions as sending only the changes to the server:

- 22 • He testified that the “core of the invention” was sending “updates of queries” Ex. E (Van  
 23 de Oord Depo. 9/26/2012 at 57:12-16);
- 24 • He testified that sending updates of the queries was important because “it allows the server  
 25 to know what the user is typing as he or she is typing it and already respond to the user  
 26 during the typing instead of after the user finishes typing.” (*Id.* at 63:15-18);
- 27 • He testified that sending characters to the server as opposed to long strings was an  
 28 “advantage” because less data is transferred. (*Id.* at 65:5-20); and
- He testified that the input string is “growing” as the user types and the server copies down  
 the user input as the characters are entered. (*Id.* at 95:7-11) “[S]o basically it’s about  
 mirroring the growing string on the client, because it’s – also there it’s growing, of course,  
 because the user is typing and it’s mirroring that on the server, basically.” (*Id.*).

Mr. van de Oord’s testimony is consistent with the constructions proposed by Google as he consistently describes an invention that sends updates to the server, synchronizing an input buffer using a series of messages so that the server mirrors the changes entered by the user.

**D. MasterObjects Takes The Claim Language Out Of Context, Misinterprets The Specification, And Ignores The Court’s Prior Rulings**

MasterObjects’ arguments cannot overcome the overwhelming intrinsic record. At every step, MasterObjects engages in analysis contrary to the bedrock *Phillips* standard for claim construction. When addressing the claim language, MasterObjects overstates the differences in the relevant claim language while ignoring the overlap with the ’529 Patent’s claim language. When analyzing the specification, MasterObjects ignores the central teachings of the common specification of the ’024 and ’529 Patents concerning the nature of the “invention” as described by the patentees themselves. And for the limited specification disclosures MasterObjects does cite, it relies on inapposite excerpts taken out of context, mischaracterizing their applicability to the issue before the Court.

1. The Claim Language In The ’024 Patent Is Not “Drastically Different” From That In The ’529 And ’639 Patents

MasterObjects argues repeatedly that the claims of the ’024 Patent and the ’529 and ’639 Patents are “glaring[ly]” and “drastically different.”<sup>8</sup> Dkt. 40 at 18-19. But the Additional Characters terms at issue here are not meaningfully different from the Additional Characters terms this Court previously construed.

MasterObjects contends that the omission of the words “lengthen,” “modify,” “consecutive additional characters,” “corresponding consecutive queries,” and “plurality of queries” from the claim language of the ’024 Patent suggests that the ’024 claims do not require sending the server

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<sup>8</sup> MasterObjects claims it amended the ’024 Patent claims in response to constructions by the prior defendants for the Additional Characters terms. Dkt. 40 at 8. But Google only first disclosed its proposed construction of the Additional Characters terms in October 2012—long after MasterObjects had proposed the claim language in the ’024 Patent. MasterObjects cites to prior defendant Yahoo!’s proposed construction for the term “communication protocol” of the ’529 and ’639 Patents, but Yahoo! never proposed a construction containing the phrase (or concept) “only the changes.” See Dkt. 40, Ex. 4 at 2, table, row 2, column 3.



1 only the changes from what was sent previously. *Id.* at 5. MasterObjects elevates form over  
2 substance. For example, MasterObjects argues that the '024 Patent claim language no longer  
3 includes the word “lengthen.” But the '024 Patent claims include the term “lengthening string”  
4 multiple times. The claims do not have “drastically” different scope merely because they describe  
5 lengthening using an adjective rather than a verb. MasterObjects also ignores that the construed  
6 claims from the '529 and '639 Patents each differed with respect to their use of these terms as  
7 well. Indeed, claims 1 and 13 of the '639 Patent did not contain any of these terms.

8 MasterObjects relies on the word “represent” to support its construction, arguing that “the  
9 ‘query message’ logically portrays the lengthening string/input (i.e., the full string).” Dkt. 40 at  
10 14. This misreads the claim language which requires not that *one* query message represent the  
11 lengthening string, but instead that “query messages”—plural—represent the lengthening string.  
12 As explained above, this is entirely consistent with Google’s proposed construction, whereby the  
13 combination of the query messages “represents” the lengthening string (e.g., query messages “a,”  
14 “b,” and “c” represent “abc”). It does not support, and certainly does not require, MasterObjects’  
15 view that a single “query message” contains the entire input string.

16 For claim 35, MasterObjects argues that the recitation of “multiple query messages  
17 corresponding to multiple versions of said input” contradicts Google’s construction. Dkt. 40 at 15.  
18 To support this claim, MasterObjects argues that the word “corresponding” requires the query  
19 messages to contain the entire input buffer. *Id.* But MasterObjects provides no explanation of  
20 why query messages containing “a,” “b,” and “c” would not “correspond” to versions of the input  
21 “a,” “ab,” “ and “abc.” Furthermore, the specification contradicts MasterObjects’ interpretation.  
22 In describing Figure 4, the '024 Patent states “[a]n additional character event 404 is generated  
23 when the user has typed a second character ‘b’ into the Questlet. As before, a **corresponding**  
24 event arrives at the Server Quester.” '024 Pat., 18:64-66; '529 Pat., 18:62-64 (emphasis added).  
25 As explained above, the “corresponding event” sent from the client to the server is a message only  
26 containing the letter “b.”

27 Although the Court also relied on other claim language in its prior order, the core of the  
28 Court’s analysis remains equally applicable here: the “additional characters” comprise the

1 “lengthening string” formed on the server. MasterObjects glosses over this key and overlapping  
 2 claim language, and only Google’s proposed construction gives these common terms “additional”  
 3 and “lengthening” any meaning. In particular, Google’s constructions reflect what the claim  
 4 language itself makes plain: the claims cover sending “additional characters” rather than re-  
 5 sending the entire input string, and, in that way, the “lengthening string” is created at the server.

6 If MasterObjects wanted the claims to cover sending the entire input string each time, it  
 7 could have tried to draft claims to say just that. (Such claims, however, would have failed the  
 8 written description requirement, as explained *infra* in Section V.) MasterObjects instead drafted  
 9 the claims more opaquely, resulting in claims that nowhere discuss re-sending the entire input  
 10 string from the client to the server, or any similar language to that effect. The current set of claims  
 11 thus include the same basic features this Court found limited to sending “only the changes.” The  
 12 Court should not allow MasterObjects to gain via claim construction what it did not seek (and,  
 13 given the contrary teachings of the specification, could not have obtained) during prosecution.

## 14 2. MasterObjects’ Constructions Ignore And Mischaracterize The 15 Specification

16 Both parties agree that the Court should consult the specification to ascertain the meaning  
 17 of the Additional Characters terms. *See* Dkt. 40 at 19. But MasterObjects ignores the Abstract,  
 18 Summary of the Invention and the discussions of the “present invention” throughout the  
 19 specification. In the few portions of the specification MasterObjects does discuss, it takes  
 20 disclosures out of context and contravenes basic claim construction principles.<sup>9</sup>

21 Despite relying on the specification for its construction of “query messages,”  
 22 MasterObjects argues that the specification should be ignored because in the prior case Google  
 23 argued that only the claim language (and not the specification) supported the “only the changes”  
 24 claim construction. Dkt. 40 at 7. MasterObjects is wrong. Google has argued that the  
 25 specification, and specifically its statements regarding “the present invention,” supported Google’s

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26  
 27 <sup>9</sup> As discussed in more detail below, MasterObjects’ disclosure lacks written description  
 28 support for the constructions it offers. *See infra*, Section V.

1 construction. Ex. C (Google’s Claim Constructions Presentation, dated Jan. 30, 2013) at Slide  
2 149. This Court agreed with Google in its claim construction rulings, citing the very portion of the  
3 specification Google identified in its presentation to this Court. *Compare id. with MasterObjects*  
4 *I*, Dkt. 153 at 17. Google continued to emphasize the specification’s limiting statements at the  
5 Federal Circuit. *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 14-1148 (Fed. Cir.), Dkt. 43 at 45-  
6 47 (citing *Honeywell* and *Trading Techs.*).

7 MasterObjects also points to claim construction opinions by other courts as to *other* claim  
8 terms, specifically the term “communication protocol.” Dkt. 40 at 7. Those constructions are not  
9 relevant to the inquiry here. Indeed, this Court came to the same conclusion regarding the  
10 “communication protocol” term in *MasterObjects I* and had no trouble still finding the  
11 specification limited for purposes of the Additional Characters terms. *Compare MasterObjects I*,  
12 Dkt. 153 at 8 with 15-17.

13 MasterObjects also repeats arguments from its appellate briefing where it claims to find  
14 instances where the specification describes re-sending the entire string. Dkt. 40 at 15; *see also*  
15 *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 14-1148 (Fed. Cir.), Dkt. 30 at 38-39. However, the  
16 specification discloses no such thing. First, MasterObjects quotes, out of context, the  
17 specification’s note that “[t]he system’s protocol is not restricted to sending single characters” and  
18 can also “send a string of characters.” ’024 Pat., 12:5-7. That statement does not say or even  
19 suggest that the system may re-send already-transmitted characters. Rather, immediately before  
20 this statement, the patentees made clear that the protocol of the “invention” is “optimized for  
21 sending single characters from a Client to the Server.” ’024 Pat., 11:57-61. And immediately  
22 afterward, the patentees explained an exception to that rule: an “entire string” will be sent “all at  
23 once to the Server, instead of character by character,” “when a user replaces the contents of an  
24 entry field with a new string.” ’024 Pat., 12:7-10. Simply put, sending an entire string is an  
25 exceptional circumstance, not the norm addressed by the claims, which require a lengthening  
26 string. In any event, even in that exceptional case, the client still sends only the changes to the  
27 string because the user has replaced the entire contents of the entry field with a brand new string.

MasterObjects next points to portions of two definitions (“Query Filter” and “Query Pattern”) in the specification. Dkt. 40 at 15 (citing ’024 Pat., 10:33-34; 10:46-48). However, as Google also pointed out previously, the patent states that the “Query Filter” and “Query Pattern” are part of the “Query Manager,” which it defines as “An intelligent part of a Content Channel that interprets QuestObjects Queries and sends them to a Content Engine .... *The Query Manager can also send a list of Query Patterns and Query Filters to the Server Quester*, allowing the Server Quester to match and filter new Queries before they are sent to the Content Channel.” ’024 Pat., 10:36-43 (emphasis added); *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, Case No. 14-1148 (Fed. Cir.), Dkt. 49 at 39. Thus, MasterObjects is wrong in stating that the definitions of Query Filter and Query Pattern reflect that strings are “incoming” from the client. But even putting this aside, none of these examples suggests that the client ever re-sends previously transmitted characters.

**E. This Court Should Decline To Construe Or Reject The Constructions Proposed By MasterObjects**

MasterObjects has chosen not to propose any construction for the Additional Characters terms. Instead, MasterObjects asks this Court to construe other terms that are not properly before this Court as part of the Single Issue as described above in Section II.C. To decide the Single Issue, the Court need construe only the Additional Characters terms as described above. In any event, MasterObjects’ proposed constructions are legally erroneous and should be rejected.

1. “Query Messages”

“querv messages” (claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36 & 37)	
Google	MasterObjects
Google’s proposed construction for this term is subsumed within the Google’s proposed constructions for the Additional Characters terms. No construction necessary at this time apart from consideration as part of the Additional Characters terms	Transmissions that include at least the “input.”

MasterObjects argues that the use of the term “query messages” in the ’024 Patent’s claims alters the claimed invention such that the entire input string, not “only the changes,” is sent to from the client to the server. Dkt. 40 at 8 (citing ’024 Pat., 18:67–19:2). MasterObjects’ argument runs contrary to the claim language and the specification of the ’024 Patent.

1 As an initial matter, “query messages” has no plain and ordinary meaning apart from the  
 2 disclosure of the ’024 Patent. In seeking to construe “query messages” in isolation from its  
 3 surrounding claim language, MasterObjects ignores the critical intrinsic evidence as to its  
 4 meaning: all the Asserted Claims require sending “query messages” from a “client” to a “server.”  
 5 *See, e.g.*, ’024 Pat., Cl. 1 (“the ***client object*** that, while a user is providing input comprising a  
 6 lengthening string of characters, sends query messages ***to the server system.***” (emphases added))  
 7 Accordingly, the relevant disclosures in the specification are those describing communications  
 8 from the client to the server. And as this Court has held, the specification only discloses sending  
 9 “only the changes” from the client to the server. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 17.

10 As noted above, the “present invention” language explains that a variety of “messages” are  
 11 used to “to send just the changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer.”  
 12 ’024 Pat., 20:14-17. And in *MasterObjects I*, the asserted claims of the ’529 Patent required  
 13 transmitting “queries” from the client to the server, which this Court held contained “only the  
 14 changes.” *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 17 (holding for the “additional characters” terms that the  
 15 input string contains only the changes to the “query”). Combining these terms thus suggests that  
 16 the “query messages” each contain just the changes. However, MasterObjects asserts that this  
 17 term has the exact opposite meaning.


18 In support, MasterObjects points to a single use of the term “query messages” in the  
 19 specification, but that disclosure does not relate to client-server communication. Rather, it relates  
 20 to an entirely separate part of the disclosed system. Specifically, the disclosure cited by  
 21 MasterObjects describes communications between the server and a back-end server database (the  
 22 “Service”)—not the predicate communications from the client to the server that are the subject of  
 23 the Asserted Claims:

24 As before, a corresponding event ***arrives at the Server Quester***. In this case, ***the***  
 25 ***Server Quester*** may deduct that the input string represents a valid query and ***send***  
 26 ***the appropriate query message ‘ab’ to the Service.***

27 ’024 Pat., 18:65–19:3 (emphasis added); ’529 Pat., 18:63-67. The service, as a separate  
 28 mechanism within the invention, is also depicted in Figures 1 and 2. ’024 Pat., Figs. 1-2; ’529

Pat., Figs. 1-2.

The fallacy of MasterObjects' argument is clear from the following annotated version of Figure 4, which depicts two distinct types of communications: those between the Client (blue) and the Server (green) and those between the Server (green) and the Service (orange):



The language on which MasterObjects relies states that the “**Server** Quester [highlighted in green above] may . . . send the appropriate query message ‘ab’ **to the Service** [highlighted in orange].” ’024 Pat., 18:67–19:2; ’529 Pat., 18:65-67. But these server-to-service communications are distinct from the client-to-server communications required by the claims. Simply put, MasterObjects relies on an irrelevant portion of the specification.

Confirming this, the specification of the ’024 and ’529 Patents describes separate mechanisms to communicate between the server and service as opposed to the client and server. For the client to the server, the specification explains that the “Clients use a **communication protocol 102 to send information**, including but not limited to single characters, and to receive information, including but not limited to lists of strings and corresponding metadata.” ’024 Pat., 12:50-55 (emphasis added); ’529 Pat., 12:48-53. On the other hand, “Servers have a **communication link 104** to a Service 105, which they use to obtain the information that they send to the Client.” ’024 Pat., 12:60-62 (emphasis added); ’529 Pat., 12:58-60. This communication link 104 is never described as sending data from a client to a server.



1 Tellingly, though MasterObjects repeatedly argued in *MasterObjects I* that the  
2 specification disclosed sending the entire string from the client to the server, it never once relied  
3 on this disclosure of “query messages” sent between the server and the service. At oral argument  
4 one Circuit Judge asked MasterObjects’ counsel where the specification describes sending of the  
5 entire input string, to which MasterObjects’ counsel had no response. Oral Argument at 7:35-  
6 8:50, *MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, No. 11-1148 (Fed. Cir.), *available at*:  
7 <http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/search/audio.html>. MasterObjects  
8 certainly did not cite the part of the specification on which it currently relies as supposedly  
9 providing support for its theories. The reason is simple: it is not a disclosure of re-sending an  
10 entire query from the client to the server. This Court should not endorse MasterObjects’ attempt  
11 to take a single passage in the specification out of context and repurpose it to suit its needs here,  
12 when doing so would ignore the claim language, the specification as a whole, and this Court’s  
13 prior claim construction rulings.

14 Instead, as this Court has already found, the specification shared by the ’529 and ’024  
15 Patents discloses sending only the changes as opposed to the whole string from the client to the  
16 server. The Court’s prior analysis applies here with equal force here. *See Microsoft Corp. v.*  
17 *Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.*, 357 F.3d 1340, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (resolving a claim construction  
18 dispute involving variations in claim language across three related patents by relying on a  
19 description of the “present invention” shared in the patents’ common specification).

20 MasterObjects’ position that each “query message” includes the “full input string” would  
21 result in excluding not only the preferred embodiment, but all disclosed embodiments from the  
22 scope of the claims. As a basic matter of claim construction, that cannot be correct. *See Kaneka*  
23 *Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp.*, 790 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A claim construction  
24 that excludes a preferred embodiment is ‘rarely, if ever, correct.’ A construction that excludes *all*  
25 disclosed embodiments ... is especially disfavored.”) (citations omitted). The description in the  
26 Abstract (discussing sending the query “character-by-character”), Detailed Description (same) and  
27 numerous other descriptions of how “the present invention” works would all be excluded by  
28 MasterObjects’ proposals. *See Osram GmbH v. ITC*, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(construction of a term is erroneous when it is “at odds with the purposes of the invention.”). MasterObjects’ singular, irrelevant, and non-definitional cite is not sufficient to overcome this evidence.

MasterObjects also argues that dependent claims 18 and 28 mandate its construction of “query message.” Dkt. 40 at 13. This analysis misses the mark because those dependent claims discuss sending other types of metadata, i.e., “a request identification” and “an ID” in a query message. They are not germane to whether the ’024 Patent describes and claims re-sending the entire input string in each message. Moreover, both of those claims confirm that the query message is sent from the client “to the server”—again undercutting MasterObjects’ reliance on the single passage in the specification involving sending content from the server to the service. Claims 18 and 28, therefore, do not support MasterObjects’ construction.

## 2. “Input”

“input” (claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36 & 37)	
Google	MasterObjects
Google’s proposed construction for this term is subsumed within the Google’s proposed constructions for the Additional Characters terms. No construction necessary at this time apart from consideration as part of the Additional Characters terms	A string of one or more characters provided by a user.  For Claim 36 Only: A string of one or more characters provided by a software process.

Like “query messages,” the term “input” need not be construed as part of the Single Issue apart from the Additional Characters terms. For “input” though, the issue is even simpler. The ’529 Patent claims also included the term “input.” *See, e.g.*, ’529 Pat., Cl. 1 (“receives, as **input**, consecutive additional characters from the client software” (emphasis added)). MasterObjects proposed no construction for “input” during *MasterObjects I*. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 107. Instead, MasterObjects was well aware of its meaning in the context of the Additional Characters terms: MasterObjects went so far to include the term “input” (without construction) in its proposed “backup” construction for the Additional Characters terms. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 16. “Input” was thus implicitly construed previously as part of the Additional Characters terms and there is thus no need to construe it again here. *NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.*, 418 F.3d



1 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Because NTP’s patents all derive from the same parent application  
2 and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted  
3 patents.”); *Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.*, 334 F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e  
4 presume, unless otherwise compelled, that the same claim term in the same patent or related  
5 patents carries the same construed meaning.”).<sup>10</sup>

6 MasterObjects’ proposal for “input” again highlights its flawed claim construction  
7 approach, proposing to construe simple terms like “input” in isolation and without consideration  
8 of their role in the Additional Characters terms as a whole. Viewing the claim language in  
9 context, the claims use “input” and “query messages” differently. The user enters “input,” after  
10 which “query messages” are sent to the server. If “input” and “query messages” had the same  
11 meaning, then the claims could simply have stated that the “input” is sent to the server. But, the  
12 claims instead describe “input” separately from “query messages,” with different purpose and  
13 different meaning. A construction that renders claim language superfluous is generally disfavored.  
14 *Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.*, 381 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir.  
15 2004). MasterObjects gives lip service to this claim construction canon by proposing differently  
16 formed constructions for “input” and “query messages,” but the substance of its proposed  
17 constructions does the opposite, conflating what the patentee claimed as “input” with “query  
18 messages” and rewriting the claim to cover re-sending the entire input string. As discussed above,  
19 the claim language and the specification undermine this approach.

20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>10</sup> If anything, construing “input” as MasterObjects proposes only adds confusion because it  
28 repeats other claim elements. For example, MasterObjects’ proposals repeat where input comes  
from, which is already specified by the claim language.

3. “Query”/“Queries”

“query” / “queries” (claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 28, 32 & 33)	
Google	MasterObjects
Google’s proposed construction for this term is subsumed within the Google’s proposed constructions for the Additional Characters terms. No construction necessary at this time apart from consideration as part of the Additional Characters terms	“query” - A string of one or more characters used to perform a search.  “queries” - Strings of one or more characters used to perform searches.

The Court already considered the term “query” and “queries” as part of the larger Additional Character terms during claim construction in *MasterObjects I*. See, e.g., *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 16 (listing the first of the Additional Characters terms as “wherein each of the plurality of *queries* form an increasingly lengthening *query* string for retrieving content from the server; and wherein the server receives the plurality of *queries* . . .”) MasterObjects’ proposal contradicts this usage, and it has not demonstrated any reason why these terms in the ’024 Patent’s claims require a different construction from the ’529 Patent’s claims considered previously by the Court. *NTP*, 418 F.3d at 1293. This Court did not need to construe “query” or “queries” in *MasterObjects I* beyond their plain and ordinary meaning when considering the Additional Characters terms in the ’529 Patent, and in fact used the word “query” in its construction without any further construction or explanation. The same should hold true here.

Finally, MasterObjects provides no basis to include the phrase “to perform a search” in its construction. Its citation to the Webster’s Computer Dictionary does not include any language suggesting that “to perform a search” should be included and this construction is unsupported. Further, MasterObjects identifies no reason for this term to be construed in relation to the Single Issue, nor what import it might have.

#### F. MasterObjects’ Technology Background Is Contrary To The Evidence And Irrelevant

MasterObjects’ description of its purported “search technology” is devoid of any factual basis or any citation to the record. Dkt. 40 at 1-3. Instead, it consists purely of attorney argument untethered to the evidence. These arguments should be disregarded and not considered by the

1 Court. *Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG*, 745 F.3d 490, 503 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Attorney argument  
2 is not evidence.”) (*vacated on other grounds by* 564 Fed. App’x. 599 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

3 Even if considered, the points articulated by MasterObjects are incorrect and irrelevant.  
4 MasterObjects contends that “Mr. Smit’s invention was agnostic to the precise manner in which  
5 data was transmitted between the client and server.” Dkt. 40 at 2. This is contrary to the factual  
6 record: In the patent application, Mr. Smit and his co-inventor, Mr. van de Oord, declared that the  
7 protocol of the alleged “invention” “provides a number of messages that allow the Client Quester  
8 to send just the changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer.” ’024 Pat.,  
9 20:14-17; ’529 Pat., 20:11-14. Mr. van de Oord similarly testified that sending updates to the  
10 query is part of the “core of the invention.” van de Oord Depo. 9/26/2015 at 57:12-16. Finally,  
11 self-serving characterizations by MasterObjects’ counsel in 2015 as to Mr. Smits subjective intent  
12 in 2001 are not relevant for purposes claim construction. *Acco Brands USA, LLC v. Comarco*  
13 *Wireless Techs., Inc.*, No. C 11-04378 RS, 2013 WL 843447, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013).<sup>11</sup>

14 **IV. MASTEROBJECTS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THAT THE**  
15 **ASSERTED CLAIMS DO NOT REQUIRE SENDING ONLY THE CHANGES OF**  
16 **THE INPUT STRING TO THE SERVER**

17 This case is an attempt by MasterObjects to re-litigate an issue already decided by this  
18 Court in a case involving the same parties, the same accused product, and related patents  
19 disclosing the same alleged invention and sharing an identical specification. Equitable principles  
20 of collateral estoppel should prevent MasterObjects from doing do. *See Blonder-Tongue Labs.,*  
*Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found.*, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).

21 The Federal Circuit has cautioned against applying collateral estoppel for different patents  
22 covering similar inventions, and even cautioned about automatically applying collateral estoppel

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23 <sup>11</sup> MasterObjects also suggests that a 2004 commercial embodiment “sends the complete  
24 input,” “not just the changes.” Dkt. 40 at 3. The record again contradicts this statement. Mr. van  
25 den Oord testified under oath that the product they worked on sent only the changes and did not  
26 retransmit the string. van den Ord Depo. 9/26/2015 at 86:11-15 (agreeing that the QuestObjects  
27 product: did “not resend to the server things that had already been typed in by the user and sent  
28 from the client previously.”). And in any event, this alleged commercial embodiment was not  
released until 2004 (three years after the purported priority date in 2001) and cannot provide  
contemporaneous evidence of the inventors’ thinking at the time of the invention.

1 “**solely** because the patents are related.” *e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Techs., Inc.*, 772 F.3d 723,  
 2 726 (Fed. Cir. 2014). However, when the patents are not only related, but also contain identical  
 3 specifications, and where the Court’s prior order construed terms of “the invention,” those same  
 4 constructions should be adopted by subsequent courts out of fairness to the litigants. Once a court  
 5 delineates the boundaries of a disclosed “invention,” a party should not have to continually re-  
 6 litigate that issue, merely because a patentee has the option of serially filing continuation patent  
 7 applications. This is especially true here, where MasterObjects openly asserts that it purposefully  
 8 amended its claim language in 2012 in an attempt to circumvent the constructions advanced by the  
 9 defendants in co-pending litigation.

#### 10 A. Claim Construction Findings Can Have Collateral Estoppel Impact

11 Where a court previously resolved a dispute over the contents of a given patent  
 12 specification, equitable principles of collateral estoppel should prevent a party to that prior dispute  
 13 from subsequently re-litigating the identical issue in a related patent sharing the identical  
 14 specification. *See, e.g., Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. C-10-04686 RMW*, 2013 WL  
 15 2951039, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2013), *aff’d sub nom. Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Microsoft*  
 16 *Mobile Oy*, 597 F. App’x 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

17 *Nazomi* is instructive here. The patentee brought two patent infringement actions against  
 18 technology companies asserting patent claims covering technology that processes machine code or  
 19 “instruction sets” in the hardware of computers. *Id.* at \*1. In the first action, the district court  
 20 construed the term “instructions,” relying largely upon the patent’s specification. *Id.* at \*5. In the  
 21 subsequent action, the patentee brought suit on related but different patents with a similar  
 22 specification and different claim language. *Id.* The court held that collateral estoppel barred the  
 23 patentee’s attempt to re-litigate the construction of “instructions”:

24 Although it is true that the claims of these patents differ, ***the language in the***  
 25 ***claims must be understood in light of the teachings of the specifications***, which  
 26 are essentially identical. ***The specification should be the source of the definition***  
 27 ***of unclear terms in the claims*** . . . Because all of the patents share a common  
 28 specification and the “specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a  
 disputed term,” the claim construction issue before this court is identical to the one  
 already decided in [the prior case]. Therefore, collateral estoppel applies.

*Id.* (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The same analysis applies here.

**B. MasterObjects Is Barred From Re-Litigating The Content Of The Common '529 And '024 Patent Specification**

The Court previously made an express finding concerning the scope of the specification shared by the '529 and '024 Patents. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 17 (discussing the “invention as a whole,” not a particular embodiment). As in *Nazomi*, the language of the Additional Characters terms “must be understood in light of the teachings of the specifications,” and the specification shared between the '529 and '024 Patents “should be the source of the definition of unclear terms in the claims.” 2013 WL 2951039, at \*5.

MasterObjects now seeks to overturn the findings of this Court on what the specification discloses. This Court’s statement in its previous claim construction order that MasterObjects “does not provide adequate support for its argument that the entire character string is re-sent as the user types in a query” remains true here. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 17. The Federal Circuit affirmed this Court’s claim construction decision. There is no need to re-litigate this issue.

All the elements of collateral estoppel apply. *See Trevino v. Gates*, 99 F.3d 911, 923 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing elements of collateral estoppel in the Ninth Circuit). First, the identical issue of the common specification exists here and in *MasterObjects I*. Second, the issue of whether the specification’s description of the “present invention” is limited to “only the changes” was actually litigated by the parties. It was hotly disputed at claim construction, in MasterObjects’ motion for leave to move to reconsider that order, and during the parties’ appeal before the Federal Circuit. MasterObjects thus had every opportunity to make the argument that it now seeks to make. Finally, the Additional Characters terms’ claim constructions were a critical and necessary part of the judgment, as the construction formed the basis of the parties’ stipulation of noninfringement and the resulting judgment. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 189. To prevail on the Single Issue, MasterObjects must overturn this Court’s holdings as to the content of the common specification of the '024 and '529 Patents, including the finding that the specification’s discussion limits the “invention as a whole” to sending only the changes. It should be collaterally estopped from doing so. Applying collateral estoppel in this instance furthers the purposes of the doctrine, providing finality in judgments and preventing parties from having to re-litigate issues already

1 adjudged by the courts.

2 **V. IF THIS COURT WERE TO ADOPT MASTEROBJECTS' CONSTRUCTIONS,**  
 3 **THE ASSERTED CLAIMS WOULD BE INVALID FOR LACK OF WRITTEN**  
 4 **DESCRIPTION**

5 While the '024 Patent claims priority to an application filed in 2001, the '024 Patent itself  
 6 was filed February 2012 and only issued in September 2013—four months after this Court's claim  
 7 construction decision in *MasterObjects I*. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153. In its brief, MasterObjects  
 8 asserts that, in 2012, it tried to draft new claims to encompass claim scope different from its prior  
 9 issued patents. Dkt. 40 at 8. MasterObjects goes further, arguing that it changed the claim  
 10 language in 2012 in “drastic[]” fashion. *Id.* at 18. This type of retroactive claiming, done without  
 11 regard to the bounds of the original disclosure, is not permitted by patent law. Rather, a patent  
 12 applicant may claim subject matter only if it was originally disclosed. This is known as the  
 “written description” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.

13 Under MasterObjects' constructions, its “drastically” different claims are not described in  
 14 the 2001 application to which the '024 Patent claims priority. The application filed in 2001 did  
 15 not describe sending more than the changes to the input string from the client to the server. *See*  
 16 Declaration of Prof. Martin Rinard, Ph.D., at ¶ 45 (hereafter “Rinard Decl.”). Thus, to the extent  
 17 the claims cover sending more than just the changes, they are invalid for lack of written  
 18 description.

19 This scenario is exactly what the written description doctrine seeks to prevent: A patentee  
 20 filing different and unsupported new claims 10 years after the original filing date. *See Ariad*  
 21 *Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 598 F.3d 1336, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). In the wake of  
 22 this Court's claim construction decision finding the “invention as a whole” limited to sending only  
 23 the changes to the input string, MasterObjects may not seek to procure new claims covering  
 24 precisely the opposite. To the extent MasterObjects' proposed constructions are adopted, the  
 25 Asserted Claims are invalid for failing to satisfy the written description requirement.

26 **A. Legal Standards For Written Description**

27 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, “[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the  
 28 invention.” “[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure.” *Ariad*, 598 F.3d at 1351. A

1 specification adequately describes an invention when it “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the  
 2 art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” *Id.* at 1351.  
 3 “A ‘mere wish or plan’ for obtaining the claimed invention is not adequate written  
 4 description.” *Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs*, 636 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 5 The written description requirement demands that the specification provide “sufficient information  
 6 in the original disclosure to show that the inventor possessed the invention at the time of the  
 7 original filing.” *Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings*, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed.  
 8 Cir. 2004).

9 **B. MasterObjects Construction Covers Re-Sending The Entire Input String**  
 10 **From The Client To The Server**

11 MasterObjects’ proposed constructions are, by its own admission, designed for one  
 12 purpose: To cover re-sending the entire input string from the client to the server, not just the  
 13 changes. *See* Dkt. 40 at 12 (“‘query messages’ are properly understood to include the full input  
 14 string ... not just the changes”). Accordingly, for the claims to satisfy the written description  
 15 requirement, the specification of the ’024 Patent (which is the same as the original 2001  
 16 application) must convey to one of ordinary skill that the inventors “actually invented” re-sending  
 17 the entire input string from the client to the server. *Ariad*, 598 F. 3d at 1351. The specification  
 18 fails to do so.

19 **C. The ’024 Patent Specification Only Discloses Sending The Changes To The**  
 20 **Input String, Never Re-Sending The Entire Input String, From The Client To**  
 21 **The Server**

22 As recounted above, the ’024 Patent specification describes in detail how the client sends  
 23 the input string to the server: By sending single characters, or at most only the changes to the  
 24 input string. *See, e.g.*, Sections II.A, III. The patent refers to its approach as sending a “character-  
 25 by-character string of data.” ’024 Pat., Abstract (“The invention provides a session-based bi-  
 26 directional multi-tier client-server asynchronous information database search and retrieval system  
 27 *for sending a character-by-character string of data . . .*” (emphasis added)).

28 Prof. Rinard analyzed the entire specification of the ’024 Patent and found that it solely  
 discloses sending “only the changes” to the input string from the client to the server. Rinard



Decl., ¶ 45. For example, he found that Figure 4 and its corresponding description, which illustrate the communications between the client and server, describe sending only the changes:

Figure 4 thus illustrates that the messages sent from the client to the server to update the input buffer at the server do not contain the entire input buffer from the client. They instead contain only the changes required to synchronize the client and server input buffers. In other words, in Figure 4, the first message is “a,” the second is “b,” and the third is “c”; there are no messages sent from the client to the server containing previously entered characters, such as the messages “ab” or “abc.” Figure 4 thus describes sending only the changes from the client to the server and not ever resending the entire input string.

Rinard Decl., ¶ 55. The specification expressly confirms Prof. Rinard’s opinions and analysis, stating that “the protocol of the present invention provides a number of messages that allow the Client Quester to send just the changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer.” ’024 Pat., 20:14-17. The specification is uniform in this regard, describing only sending the changes to the input string and not the entire input string. Rinard Decl., ¶ 60; *see also* Section III. Conversely, Prof. Rinard also found that the ’024 patent’s specification *never discloses* re-sending the entire input string from the client to the server. “[T]he entirety of the specification fails to describe sending anything other than the changes to the input string from the client to the server.” Rinard Decl., ¶ 62.

The ’024 Patent specification, therefore, does not reasonably convey to one skilled in the art that the inventors of the ’024 Patent had possession of an invention whereby an entire input string is resent from the client to the server each time the user types an additional character. *See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapp, Inc.*, 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

#### **D. MasterObjects Is Attempting To Claim The Opposite Of What It Disclosed In The ’024 Patent’s Specification**

MasterObjects’ proposed constructions do not just reveal a lack of disclosure in the ’024 Patent’s specification. Rather, by arguing that its claims cover re-sending the entire input string from the client to the server, MasterObjects is attempting to claim the opposite of what it disclosed in its original filing. MasterObjects’ approach contravenes Federal Circuit precedent.

As this Court previously found, the patent’s “invention as a whole” involves sending only the changes to the input string. *MasterObjects I*, Dkt. 153 at 17 (*citing* ’529 Pat., 20:11-14); *see* ’024 Pat., 20:14-17 (same disclosure). The remainder of the specification, including the Abstract

1 and other repeated statements about “the invention,” confirm this Court’s finding. *See* Rinard  
 2 Decl., ¶¶ 63-68 (citing ’024 Pat., Abstract; 8:31-38; 20:14-23; 11:57-61); *see also id.*, ¶ 38  
 3 (explaining that the “invention” is designed to “synchronize” data held by the client and by the  
 4 server, as opposed to transmitting and retransmitting the same input string data). *See* ’024 Pat.,  
 5 5:66-6:3; 8:41-44.

6 MasterObjects now argues that its claims cover re-sending the entire input string—i.e., the  
 7 opposite of the “only the changes,” “character-by-character,” “synchronization” approach  
 8 described in the specification. *See* Rinard Decl., ¶¶ 38, 63-68. The seminal case of *Gentry*  
 9 *Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.*, 134 F. 3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) forbids this approach. There, the  
 10 Federal Circuit explained that “the scope of the right to exclude may be limited by a narrow  
 11 disclosure.” In finding the claims invalid for lack of written description, the court held:

12 As the disclosure states, identifying the only purpose relevant to the console,  
 13 “[a]nother object of the present invention is to provide . . . a console positioned  
 14 between [the reclining seat] that accommodates the controls for both of the  
 reclining seats.” *Id.* at col. 1, ll. 33-37. Thus, locating the controls anywhere but on  
 the console is outside the stated purpose of the invention

15 *Id.* This analysis applies equally to MasterObjects’ constructions, where MasterObjects is now  
 16 trying to claim the opposite of the invention disclosed in its patent. The claims are invalid under  
 17 *Gentry Gallery*.

#### 18 **E. Unrelated Server-To-Service Disclosure Cannot Cure The Deficiency In The** 19 **Specification For Client-To-Server Communications**

20 MasterObjects relies on disclosure of server-to-service communications in an attempt to  
 21 support its proposed claim construction. Dkt. 40 at 8 (citing ’024 Pat., 18:67–19:2). Similarly,  
 22 MasterObjects may try to rely on this disclosure in opposition to Google’s written description  
 23 summary judgment motion. As with claim construction, however, that disclosure is simply beside  
 24 the point; it cannot serve as written description support for the claims as construed by  
 25 MasterObjects. *See* Section V.

26 The disclosure on which MasterObjects may rely describes only server-to-service  
 27 communications, not client-to-server communications, as explained above in Section III.E.1.  
 28 These two types of communications, however, are entirely distinct aspects of the disclosed system.

1 Rinard Decl., ¶ 80. The two have different requirements and parameters, and are not  
2 interchangeable. *Id.* Thus, because all the Asserted Claims expressly require that the “query  
3 messages” are sent from the *client* to the *server*, discussion in the patent of communications  
4 between the *server* and the *service* does not constitute written description support for the claim  
5 limitations in question. *ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.*, 558 F. 3d 1378 (Fed.  
6 Cir. 2009) (“We reject ICU’s contention that the figures and descriptions that include spikes  
7 somehow demonstrate that the inventor possessed a medical valve that operated without a spike.”);  
8 *see also Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.*, 601 F. 3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

9 **F. The Asserted Claims Are Invalid Under MasterObjects’ Constructions**

10 As construed by MasterObjects, the Asserted Claims cover sending the entire string from  
11 the client to the server. For the reasons explained above, the specification of the ’024 patent fails  
12 to reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors invented that subject  
13 matter back in 2001. Indeed, the specification conveys exactly the opposite—that what the  
14 inventors invented was a system that sends “only the changes” to the input string from the client to  
15 the server. If MasterObjects’ proposed claim constructions are adopted, then the claims are  
16 invalid for lack of written description.

17 **VI. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED**

18 For the foregoing reasons, Google requests that this Court adopt its proposed  
19 constructions, reject MasterObjects’ constructions, and find that Google does not infringe the  
20 Asserted Claims. In the alternative, should this Court adopt MasterObjects’ proposed  
21 constructions, Google requests that this Court declare the asserted claims invalid as failing to  
22 satisfy the written description requirement.

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Respectfully submitted,

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